1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT					
2	FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION					
3	RAGHAVENDER MALLANNAGARI,		No. 09 C 1352			
4	Plai	Plaintiff,				
5	-VS-		February 16, 2010 1:30 o'clock p.m.			
6	- 45-	,	{			
7	GSS AMERICA, INC., et	{				
8	Defendants.)					
9	TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS					
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE WAYNE R. ANDERSEN					
11	APPEARANCES:					
12	For the Plaintiff:	THE LAW OF 542 South	FICE OF J. BRYAN WOOD			
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14		BY: MR. J	AMES BRYAN WOOD and			
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24		DI. III. O	, will it it it.			
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THE COURT: You are probably wondering why we are 2 having oral argument. When I heard that Ellen was involved, 3 I thought, what can we do to get her into this court? So --4 MS. DOMPH: I am not saying anything. 5 standing on my pleadings. 6 That is a challenge. We will see. THE COURT: 7 Please be seated. Are we expecting anybody else? 8 I don't think so. MR. PINELLI: 9 THE COURT: Okay. So why don't we go around and 10 state your name for the record and who you represent. 11 Sure. Bryan Wood for the plaintiff, MR. WOOD: 12 Mr. Mallannagari. 13 Michael Brown for the plaintiff. MR. BROWN: 14 MR. FIEWEGER: Jim Fieweger on behalf of defendant 15 GSS America and GSS Infotech. 16 MR. PINELLI: Good afternoon, Judge, Anthony 17 Pinelli, P-I-N-E-L-I, for GSS America, Inc., GSS Infotech, 18 Mr. Dheeraj Akula and Associate Systems LLC. 19 MR. BLEGEN: Patrick Blegen for Bhargav Marepally 20 and Ramish Yerrasmsetti. 21 MR. BRAYMAN: Paul Brayman on behalf of Mr. Patel, 22 Mr. Adlakonda and Mr. Capalby. 23 THE COURT: Would you want to announce -- we don't 24 want to make her a liar right off the bat, so since she said 25 she would say nothing, do you want to tell the Court that

1 Miss Domph is here and who she represents. 2 MS. DOMPH: Ellen Domph for Tilak Chalasani. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 Even though it is the defendant's motion, perhaps 5 one of you can take the floor and give me the background on 6 this lawsuit because I want to make sure I understand what 7 you are -- what the basis for what you are doing is. And 8 then I would like to get a summary of why the defendants 9 believe that much of the lawsuit should not remain. 10 MR. WOOD: Sure. Your Honor, would you like me to 11 come to the podium from here? 12 THE COURT: Sure, sure. Actually, I had a law 13 clerk, now a long time ago, who kept correcting me for two 14 He said that is a lectern, this is a podium. So when 15 you mount to get your gold medal, you are mounting the 16 podium. When you are going to speak, it is the lectern. 17 So fire away. 18 MR. WOOD: I will take the lectern. If it is okay, 19 your Honor, we also have a couple of handouts that will, 20 hopefully, be useful to the Court. 21 THE COURT: Okav. 22 MR. WOOD: The only -- there is only one change to 23 what has already been filed, but we just thought it would be 24 helpful. 25 THE COURT: Are they identical? I mean those are

1 multiple copies of one handout? 2 MR. WOOD: They are four copies of each handout, 3 correct. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you give one to me. 5 And then Kate O'Loughlin is, of course, with Judge Lindberg, 6 so she has that other case filed against you. And then Katie 7 Cook is working with me. There is an employment 8 discrimination. 9 MR. PINELLI: Judge, that case is settled and 10 dismissed. 11 THE COURT: Oh, it was? 12 MR. PINELLI: Yes. 13 THE COURT: You know, it is a good idea if the 14 Judge is the among the first 50 to find out. 15 MR. PINELLI: Judge, we advised Judge Lindberg. 16 THE COURT: Or, in the case of Judge Lindberg, his 17 law clerk. MR. PINELLI: Judge Lindberg entered the order 18 19 dismissing the case. 20 THE COURT: Are you leaving? 21 CLERK O'LOUGHLIN: I can. 22 THE COURT: Oh, no one told you. 23 Yeah, sometimes we don't -- you know, our law 24 clerks are the last -- you are welcome to stay. It is up to 25 So if she stays -- she is really smart, so she might

1 help me. 2 MR. WOOD: Thank you, your Honor. Plaintiff is a 3 foreign worker here from India. He was recruited, promised 4 wages, had his Visa sponsored by GSS America and --5 THE COURT: He got an H-1 visa? 6 MR. WOOD: H-1B visa, correct. 7 THE COURT: And back in the olden days when I 8 actually helped a couple people get visas, my recollection is 9 is that you had to have a specific job to get that visa. 10 MR. WOOD: That's --11 THE COURT: With a specific employer? 12 MR. WOOD: That's correct. 13 THE COURT: Right? 14 So it is not like you can say, I am a super whiz 15 violinist that some symphony in America would want, the 16 Chicago Symphony has to say to the State Department, we can't 17 find anybody like this violinist, so we would like you to 18 give him an H-1 visa, is that correct? 19 MR. WOOD: That's correct. 20 THE COURT: And so what you are saying here is that 21 GSS stepped up to the plate and said for your client, we 22 can't find his skills replicated in the American market, we 23 need him for the job we have? 24 MR. WOOD: That's correct, that is what they said, 25 your Honor.

1 THE COURT: All right. Please proceed. 2 MR. WOOD: As it turned out, that wasn't -- that 3 wasn't true. There was not work available for him as 4 represented on the LCA application. He showed up to GSS 5 America's offices from January to October of 2008 but never 6 received any paychecks or wages during that period of time. 7 It sounds as though your Honor is familiar with the H-1B 8 process, so I won't go over that in too much detail. 9 In addition to the H-1B Visa process, there is a 10 trafficking enforced labor statute which is designed to 11 prevent the -- obtaining work through the abuse of legal 12 process, legal processes like the H-1B visa process. 13 Here we allege that all of the defendants were 14 involved in violations of the tracking -- trafficking and 15 forced labor statutes. And in the Exhibit B that we 16 provided, specific counts as to each defendant. 17 The problems with the abuse of the process, as your 18 Honor is --19 THE COURT: Do you have magnifying glasses too? 20 MR. WOOD: I do not, but I can provide a bigger 21 copy, if that will assist the Court. We can -- we are happy 22 to blow it up. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24

MR. WOOD: In addition to that violation, there is also a violation of the trafficking claims for benefiting

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from the participation in a venture where you know foreign work fraud or violations of abuse of the H-1B process are going on. That is a specific statutory provision of 18 U.S.C. 2, Section 1593A.

THE COURT: Do those statutes give individuals a private cause of action?

MR. WOOD: They do. Section 1593A specifically identifies the individuals who can be sued and includes -- for a civil action and includes in those individuals -- I don't have the exact framework, the statutory language in front of me -- but includes individuals who participate in a -- who receive benefit from a venture, from participation in a venture of where they know or should know violations of forced trafficking and labor laws are going on.

That, from plaintiff's perspective, clearly applies to all of the named defendants in this matter because we specifically allege that each of them knew that forced trafficking in labor was -- was taking place.

I am going to ask Mr. Brown to go over a summary of the process or the enterprise, basically the fraudulent scheme. But what is important to note is that even if plaintiffs cannot prove their -- even if plaintiff cannot prove his RICO claim, this forced trafficking and labor statute provides an individual basis for liability for the predicate acts that are identified in Exhibit B. So even if

1 the Court finds that plaintiff somehow has not sufficiently 2 pled RICO requirements, the -- there is a -- there is a basis 3 for the forced labor and trafficking claims to go forward. 4 Additionally, plaintiff alleges that there was, 5 obviously, an unpaid wages. We allege there were control of 6 certain defendants that -- controlled by certain individual 7 defendants, not all. But the chart lays that out. 8 We also allege that there were specific 9 misrepresentations made to plaintiff on behalf of GSS and GSS 10 America which provide the basis of the fraud claims there. 11 There were also knowing misrepresentations on which plaintiff 12 relied, which we identify in our pleadings, which give rise 13 to the basis for the fraud claims against individual 14 defendants beyond GSS and GSS America. 15 But generally speaking, that provides an overview 16 of the claims on which plaintiff --17 Now, just so I understand your client's THE COURT: 18 position, when did he come to the United States? 19 MR. WOOD: Mike. 20 MR. BROWN: His first day of work was January 8th, 21 2008. 22 THE COURT: 0kav. MR. BROWN: 23 But he was in the United States prior 24 to that time, I believe, on an old BT, a student-type status.

Student visa.

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MR. WOOD:

1 THE COURT: Wait. It is a she? 2 MR. WOOD: He. 3 MR. BROWN: He. 4 THE COURT: So he stayed here. He didn't come here 5 as a result of this process? 6 MR. BROWN: He came here as a result of a different visa, I believe. I know for a fact that his --7 8 THE COURT: So probably he was here on a student 9 visa. 10 MR. BROWN: Yes, sir. 11 THE COURT: Got himself really well-educated, 12 wanted to stay here and work, and apparently got what I will 13 call the H-1 Visa to, what you are saying is in his mind, get 14 the job that GSS had for him, right? 15 MR. WOOD: Correct. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Where is he now? 17 MR. WOOD: He is here working for another employer. 18 After some difficulty he was able to transfer his visa to a 19 different employer. 20 THE COURT: So ultimately he found an employer and 21 he is operating under that same H-1 Visa? MR. WOOD: With a different --22 23 THE COURT: As far as we know. 24 MR. BROWN: Yes. MR. WOOD: With a different sponsor, right. 25

1 THE COURT: Right. And for what period of time was 2 he unemployed? 3 MR. WOOD: He was employed, but not paid by GSS, 4 from January 2008 to October 2008. 5 MR. BROWN: Yes. 6 MR. WOOD: I think he retained employment 7 elsewhere. 8 MR. BROWN: Effective November 1st, 2008. 9 THE COURT: He has represented -- you could talk, 10 that is fine. 11 MR. BROWN: 0h. 12 THE COURT: He has represented in his complaint 13 that he thought he would have a job for how much money again? 14 MR. BROWN: \$60,000.00. 15 THE COURT: A year? 16 MR. BROWN: Yes. 17 THE COURT: So why haven't you just sued for the 18 wages he lost and let it go at that? 19 MR. BROWN: There are core wage claims that are 20 based on H-1B regulations. Those core wage claims are 21 restated on that application documentation, as far as I 22 remember -- I had done this a long time ago. But on that 23 H-1B labor condition application document that goes to the 24 Department of Labor, that restates these core wage 25 obligations. That form also states if you make a false

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attestation on this form -- it is right by the signature -- then you will have violated 18 U.S.C. 1546, which is an immigration document fraud statute. That language on the LCA form itself also says that this sort of false attestation and potential violation of 1546 could subject to civil as well as criminal liability.

Now, 1546 is --

THE COURT: So wait. I want to -- maybe you are getting there. But my question is --

MR. BROWN: Oh.

THE COURT: It would seem to me that what you have alleged is a contract claim where the defendant did not perform under the contract. They -- he said, I would pay you \$60,000.00 a year. You showed up for work. He didn't have the job. And it wasn't until about ten months later or about \$50,000.00 of unpaid wages later that he got another job. So why aren't you just suing for those wages?

MR. BROWN: Well, I agree any underpaid wage claim could involve contract claim under the court's statutory claims, which the wage claim initially -- or a couple wage claims. However, that -- you know, where I was almost at, as far as that 1546, that statute reference, as far as false attestations on the LCA form, is an explicit predicate act under RICO.

So the plaintiff's position is this form, this

application form, says here is the penalty, federal immigration statute violated. RICO law specifically incorporates that statute as a predicate act which subjects a violating party to treble damages, assuming other RICO requirements are met.

MR. WOOD: I think to supplement Mr. Brown's answer, the answer goes beyond that in -- to the extent that there are other claims that -- for which plaintiff can pursue based on the same conduct that -- defendants' same legal conduct that offer him alternative damages. We, as his attorneys -- I have an obligation to inform him of those claims and pursue them, if they are viable, to maximize his recovery.

Putting that point aside, there is also the problem that he saw, when he was there, that this is -- this is a company that routinely abuses this process, that he was not the only person who was brought here under the false -- or who accepted employment under the false promise of being paid wages. There are -- there were many others like him. And based on the information he and we have been able to gather, this is -- this is a routine occurrence at that company and there are laws designed to prevent that type of thing from occurring. Congress has deemed it important. And we, on his behalf, and he as a private attorney general, want to enforce those laws, not only for himself, but also to make sure that

this type of thing doesn't happen.

THE COURT: Okay. So I am going to turn it over to the defendants in a minute. But I gather from looking at your complaint that you claim that there is lots of people in this position, in his position, although none of them go named. So -- so there is no specificity as to what their names might be. They are not running into court and complaining. And we do know that if everything you say about the immigration laws is correct, which it seems to me it is, there is an array of regulatory agencies that have the responsibility to make sure people don't do what you are talking about. Right?

MR. WOOD: Yes. The Department of Labor specifically has been involved in an investigation of GSS. Mr. Mallannagari is also working with -- or has filed a Department of Labor charge as well. He has heard, to my knowledge, nothing in response to that Department of Labor charge. Part of the problem and part of the scheme that he alleges is efforts by defendants to conceal and destroy information that the Department of Labor could have relied on in reaching a -- in reaching a finding.

I think that is part of the basis for the other matter before Judge Lindberg, was the knowledge relating to -- to that and is included as a part of Mr. Mallannagari's complaints.

The -- yes, there are those alternative enforcement mechanisms. I think in the -- as I am sure your Honor is aware as a governmental employee, in the current budget situation there is not always resources, even if there is a viable alternative.

The --

THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear why the defendant -- let's hear from the defendants.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, could I have one point that I think is important?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. BROWN: You mentioned that no other workers were named, but in fact we did name another worker named Apoorva Siddaramaiah. He was also, per his allegation and per -- I should say the complaint's allegation -- underpaid. He in his case filed a Department of Labor complaint in January of 2009. And there was a separate Department of Labor complaint. While we did not know the identity of that -- that third employee for whom the complaint was filed, Department of Labor complaint allowed the claimants, at least for a time, to remain anonymous. So -- as well as the plaintiff's own observations of the workers in the office.

But you are correct, there is not a laundry list of names, but there are other persons or claims identified.

THE COURT: I was just a little surprised that if

your guy was showing up for 30 weeks trying to find a job, making calls, and there were lots of other people that -- between those calls, which were unfruitful, that he wasn't saying hello to his neighbors and having lunch with them and getting to know their situation. So that is --

MR. BROWN: They are scared to come. I am sorry.

MR. WOOD: Right.

MR. BROWN: They are scared.

MR. WOOD: Respectfully, your Honor, we are aware of names of other people who Mr. Mallanngari can confirm. He asked us not to put their names in the complaint because of fears of retaliation and reprisal against them as they try to transition from the situation Mr. Mallanngari found himself to a different situation, as well as the overall problem of the individual's ability to be in this country being tied to the sponsor of the H-1B visa.

That said, he has not authorized us to pursue the case as a class or a collective action. It is an option we continue discussing with him. At that point we would, obviously, have to make an amendment and provide the names that your Honor says are lacking in the complaint. But we don't want you to believe there aren't individuals out there.

I think in Judge Lindberg's there was a pleading that identified an e-mail that included a list of names of individuals for whom checks were being withheld. So it is a

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part of the public record at least that there are lots of other individuals who are being affected by this.

dismiss the case and why?

Infotech.

MR. FIEWEGER: Your Honor, we haven't really agreed on any division of the arguments or what have you, and I am not inclined to step on anyone's toes or argue on behalf of anybody else. But on behalf of GSS America and GSS America Infotech, just for ease of reference, I refer to GSS America as just GSS.

Thanks. Who wants to urge me to

THE COURT: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. FIEWEGER: GSS America Infotech as GSS

GSS America is the company that offered Mr.

Mallanngari a position of employment, hired him, retained him, brought him to to the Chicago area, housed him. GSS Infotech is a company based in India with offices only in India. And when we look at the complaint, I think it is important to keep those distinctions in mind, not just for GSS and GSS Infotech but for all of these defendants because what has happened here, your Honor, really is they filed a complaint alleging RICO.

And you asked them earlier, why didn't you just file a wage claim action? And they danced around a little bit, but at one point Mr. Wood said, well, there is treble

damages under RICO. This is why they filed a RICO action, your Honor. This isn't a RICO case.

They filed their first -- their first complaint. The complaint got dismissed because they couldn't plead -- they couldn't allege an entity. All they did was charge GSS as being the association that was carrying out the alleged RICO activity. So they were -- okay. They learned now we have got to broaden it beyond -- it has got to be somebody besides GSS. So what did they do? They added GSS, GSS Infotech and a bunch of -- kind of what I think of as periphery defendants who are primarily either employees of GSS or some sorts of consultants that were hired by GSS to help them in their business in various respects.

When you look at just GSS and its employees, you are dealing with the same problem as what they had in the first complaint. It is just GSS, and that is not a RICO enterprise. So what they did was they added on these accountants, consultants, you know, IT people, people who allegedly participated in this scheme but really didn't have any role, even according to their allegations, had no role in managing or directing the scheme.

And as a result they are -- they are legally -- they should be dismissed. They are -- they are nonentities for RICO purposes. They are not -- if they are not managing or directing, they can't be a RICO defendant. They are not a

part of the association. So once you throw out these parties, these kind of hangers on that aren't managing or directing, you are back to GSS America and its employees.

Now, they add -- they make these claims against GSS Infotech about how it supposedly directed this conduct and knew about it and benefited from it. Judge, I mean this is their amended complaint. I don't know how many pages, how many paragraphs. You read this, you won't know who a single officer, director or employee of GSS Infotech is, with the exception of one individual. I think it is in Paragraph 76 -- 76A -- they say a gentleman named Mr. Raju who resides in India and is an employee of Defendant GSS and that Defendant GSS India e-mailed plaintiff and indicated he had reviewed plaintiff's resumes and provided plaintiff suggestions to get a work project for a third-party employer. That is it. That is the only specific communication or individual regarding GSS Infotech that is in this complaint.

And now they are supposed to be dragged across the ocean to answer a RICO complaint because they knew about something, they directed something, they benefited from something. You know, if we are going to drag them in, let's hear who it is, who did what, when, how. You know, and they have had an opportunity to do this and it is not here, your Honor.

And what is here is a bunch of mumbo jumbo about

1 other individuals that were working with GSS that had nothing 2 to do with RICO. So, your Honor, the RICO claim is just --3 it is fanciful. To be honest with you, I -- I agree with 4 you, this is an action about claim for past wages. Mr. 5 Mallanngari claims that he showed up and reported for work 6 and wasn't --7 THE COURT: If we -- if we were to grant your 8 motions to dismiss, what would be left of the lawsuit? 9 MR. FIEWEGER: I think the claims against -- I 10 think that the wage loss claims against GSS America. 11 THE COURT: What is your position on that? 12 MR. FIEWEGER: I think that the -- they can state a 13 claim against GSS. 14 THE COURT: Is it -- do you think that -- does your 15 client owe him the money, do you think? 16 MR. FIEWEGER: I don't know. To be honest with 17 vou, I don't know. My client -- there is going to be serious 18 factual issues in this case, your Honor. They stood up there 19 and said he reported to work for ten months. I will be 20 shocked if that is what the record shows. I mean we will see 21 what happens, but talking to my clients --22 THE COURT: Did he show up to work for ten minutes? 23 MR. FIEWEGER: For ten months. 24 THE COURT: Ten months, rather. 25 MR. WOOD: Yes. Not every day, as every person

1 takes a sick day on occasions, you know. 2 MR. FIEWEGER: Well, I mean we will try and track 3 down --4 THE COURT: I am just --5 MR. FIEWEGER: We will try and track these issues 6 down. 7 THE COURT: I just trying to imagine how we want 8 you to evidence the shock if you find out. Well, maybe your 9 hair turn white or jump up and down or something. 10 Okay. So what elements do you believe they have to 11 show to maintain a RICO action that they have failed to 12 allege? 13 MR. FIEWEGER: I feel I think that they have failed 14 to allege an association. I think they have failed to allege 15 an adequate time span. I mean they get to six years, or 16 whatever, by referring back to all of these hundreds of other 17 H-1B applicants for whom, your Honor, you pointed out, nobody 18 is complaining. We haven't heard from the Department of 19 Labor about any of those. None -- none of them are coming 20 forward to join this lawsuit. 21 I mean we represented that they are concerned about 22 retaliation against other potential plaintiffs. Your Honor, 23 unfortunately, with the -- with the economic circumstances 24 GSS has been hit hard, and I believe many of the consultants 25 who were working with them at the time Mr. Mallanngari was

1 aren't working there anymore. They don't have -- they don't 2 have the business. So this alleged concern about retaliation 3 from their current employer, my suspicion is for many of them 4 it doesn't exist because the company has had to downsize. 5 THE COURT: What is GSS' business? 6 MR. FIEWEGER: They do computer consulting. 7 go into companies and design software applications for them. 8 They are third-party computer --9 THE COURT: You want me to dismiss the RICO claims. 10 Any other claims? 11 MR. FIEWEGER: I think everything should be 12 dismissed other than the wage loss claims against GSS. 13 THE COURT: And those, you acknowledge, are federal 14 claims? 15 MR. FIEWEGER: The Fair Labor Standards Act. 16 think the other two are duplicative. 17 THE COURT: Did you answer that? 18 MR. FIEWEGER: No. 19 MR. PINELLI: Judge, I am sorry, the original 20 complaint I moved to dismiss the RICO and the slave trade. Ι 21 answered on behalf of GSS on the Fair Labor Standards claim. 22 We denied liability. We believe there is a tribal issue as 23 to whether or not anything is owed. We did answer that. We 24 got the amended complaint. I haven't answered that, but I 25 assume I am going to if you allow that claim to stand.

MR. FIEWEGER: On the motions on wage loss claims, we have moved to dismiss -- what is it -- four and five as to duplicative of three.

MR. PINELLI: We moved to dismiss the Illinois wage claims under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, not the Fair Labor Standards Act claims. They are not going to get paid twice. It is harder to get attorney's fees under the Illinois Wage Payment.

MR. FIEWEGER: Mr. Pinelli is doing them a favor.

MR. PINELLI: That was our position.

And if I might just add one other thing from the original briefing. Judge, I know we have talked about some things that I am not sure are in the complaint. In the complaint the entire allegation with respect to that second slave trade count is Paragraphs 19 and 20. Plaintiff made himself to start work on an H-1B visa on or about January 8th, 2008. When plaintiff reported to work, he learned that the programmer analyst position defendants referenced in the letter, an offer letter, did not exist. Defendants did not have a job for him."

There is no allegation in this case that anybody traveled to the United States. I looked at every case I could find -- and there aren't many under that peonage and slave trade -- but there are convictions under criminal law in the Southern District of New York where people had

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domestic folks at their home who had a visa -- they took 2 their papers -- who could not leave. They weren't paid. 3 They could not prove they were legally in America. This was 4 considered criminal conduct. There is -- nothing even 5 approaching that has been alleged. So, respectfully, I do 6 think we have a wage dispute here, but RICO and slave trade I 7 believe are quite a reach beyond this complaint.

THE COURT: And do you -- and what you are also contending is is that the -- the other named defendants, whatever -- they have nothing to do with any of this and that that is a frivolous thing to name them?

MR. PINELLI: Judge, they did not have any direction or control over GSS. My two clients, Mr. Akula and ASL, were consultants brought in to help organize documents during the Department of Labor audit that went on for a couple of months. They as outside individuals -- under the test like in the United States versus Warneke, they are outside individuals. They are not involved in the direct operation or control of the enterprise itself. If there is -- there was no bribery allegation, which is the only way for an outsider to perhaps be involved.

So for those individuals, I believe, respectfully, there just isn't enough to hold them on RICO. On the slave trade, they are in there, but there are no fact allegations about them.

1 THE COURT: Is that true -- not to speak for all of 2 you, but is that true of the other defendants as well? 3 MS. DOMPH: It is all --4 THE COURT: They are all really independent 5 consultants, they are not officers, directors of GSS? 6 MR. PINELLI: A couple of individuals are, Judge, 7 and -- but, I would like Mr. Blegen, Mr. Brayman --8 THE COURT: Okav. 9 MS. DOMPH: Just to Mr. Tilak Chalasani, he was a 10 consultant just like Mr. Akula. 11 THE COURT: That is your client? 12 MS. DOMPH: Yes, my client. So he was a consultant 13 during eight weeks of an audit. And what is interesting 14 about his situation is he worked for CES USA. They are a 15 named defendant and they have been dismissed out. And he was 16 hired through them, is my understanding -- hired through 17 them. 18 THE COURT: Hired through? 19 MS. DOMPH: CES, who has been dismissed out, I am 20 assuming because -- I am not informed why, but I am assuming 21 because they couldn't state a claim against them. And there 22 has been no allegations that he worked outside of the scope 23 of that employment for CES. CES has been dismissed out. So 24 I would adopt Mr. Pinelli's argument regarding Mr. Akula and 25 direct your attention to that issue.

1 THE COURT: Mr. Brayman, what about your client? 2 MR. BRAYMAN: Judge, two of them are directors of 3 GSS and one was inhouse counsel. You can see the summaries 4 kind of in the amended complaint. And those three people, 5 Miss Patel was an employee, as was Mr. Adlakonda. 6 Mr. Capalby. He was the -- the inhouse counsel. And all 7 they do is in their complaint just summarize their positions, 8 you know, with a company, without making any allegations what 9 they ever did to --10 THE COURT: Merit the status of being a defendant? 11 MR. BRAYMAN: Yes, right. It is just throwing in 12 employees, you know, as individual defendants with really no 13 factual allegation as to why they should be held responsible. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Patrick. 15 MR. BLEGEN: Judge --16 THE COURT: Thank you. 17 MR. BLEGEN: Similarly my clients, Mr. Marepally 18 and Mr. Yerrasmsetti -- you don't want to hear what Mr. 19 Fieweger said. What he said is right. The complaint doesn't 20 make allegations. 21 THE COURT: What is their relationship to the --22 MR. BLEGEN: CEO, Marepally and Yerrasmsetti COO. 23 As far as RICO, they allege what I call in the 24 pleadings a nebulous RICO enterprise which is this loose 25 group of people. I think, as Mr. Fieweger said, the RICO has to go out.

Illinois Minimum Wage Payment Act and FSLA are concerned for individual people like Marepally and Yerrasmsetti. And this also covers some of Mr. Brayman's clients, Capalby and Patel and Adlakonda. They haven't sufficiently alleged they meet the requirements of being employer. They sued GSS as the employer that -- that is who I assume they are interested getting their money back from.

But these individual people, they haven't alleged enough to -- so that they are either -- for purposes of the Illinois Wage Payment Act that they knowingly permitted the guy to go underpaid. And they haven't alleged enough under the -- Illinois Minimum Wage Law or of FLSA. They haven't sufficiently alleged that they had supervisor authority -- supervisory authority over the plaintiff and had partial responsibility for the alleged violation.

When you make those kind of claims in your pleading -- they cited today a paragraph of the complaint, Paragraph 84, which in my view is so -- I can't even -- I honestly don't even understand what they are saying in the paragraph. It pretty much boils down to saying that had GSS directed itself not to pay the plaintiff, but it also says that those things were done under the knowingly directive, and then they pretty much throw everybody up against the wall.

1 I don't think that is enough, even under the 2 relatively loose pleading requirements, to hold individual 3 people like Yerrasmsetti, Marepally, Patel, Capalby --4 especially the lawyer, had nothing to do with the operations 5 of even GSS and nothing to do with payment. They don't have 6 enough to hold them individually liable for the failure to 7 pay the alleged failure to pay the wages. 8 THE COURT: Do you want to make any response to any 9 of that? 10 MR. BROWN: We do. 11 MR. WOOD: We do, your Honor, we would like to 12 respond to a few points. 13 THE COURT: Okav. 14 First of all, with respect to the RICO MR. WOOD: 15 claims --16 THE COURT: And you are welcome to stay there. 17 No, you could sit down. 18 I am confused about GSS Infotech MR. BROWN: 0h. 19 who we call GSS India. They are based in India. 20 complaint -- they are referenced many times in the amended 21 complaint. And this Exhibit B chart lists all sorts of 22 paragraphs and -- in the amended complaint, but they are 23 referenced both in terms of factual allegations, also in 24 terms of legal violations and specific predicate acts. So 25 the reference to there being one reference to GSS Infotech I

don't understand.

MR. FIEWEGER: Your Honor, it was my client. Can I just clarify what I meant by that?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. FIEWEGER: There is all kinds of references GSS Infotech knew about this, GSS Infotech directed that, but they are -- who -- who at GSS Infotech did anything? When? When did they do it? How did they do it? Did they write a letter? Did somebody tell the COO? You can say GSS Infotech did this, did that, did the other thing, but there are no specifics at all.

It is like I was -- it occurred to me the other day I don't -- re-reading this amended complaint, I don't know anybody who was at GSS Infotech, so I read through -- the only person ever even mentioned from GSS Infotech is this one employee who looked at a resume. Everything is directed that with no specificity.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BROWN: Your Honor, the definition of a RICO enterprise includes explicitly a person or an entity or a corporation. So that is basically an argument that the statutory definition is incorrect somehow. But it is an entity. It is perfectly fine to specify an organization just like individuals. We have a chart here of all sorts of individuals who are listed in detail. Their names, both in

terms of persons and entities, organizational entities, parent, subsidiary, individual actors, defendants, nondefendants and we telex actually what they -- it is summarized in here exactly what they did, but we state exactly which paragraphs within the amended complaint specify the facts as to exactly what they did and when they did it and how they did it and their names and the places they were at and who they are acting on behalf of and who they were directing and who were they were being directed by. It is all in --

The main thing I am hearing from the defense in terms of argument, let's not read the complaint, 60-page document. And it wasn't fun drafting. But in terms of an enterprise, the recent Supreme Court case of Boyle defined enterprise more in terms of its functionality than splitting apart each individual actor and what their particular roles -- their roles are important -- but even more important what general purpose they serve in acting and doing what they did.

Here it is easy. The purpose is is to run a body shop, which is a temp service, which is illegal under H1-B law. Under H1-B law you can run a temp service. You can send a person from Oracle to IBM from project to project. When an employer does that and parties do that under -- for RICO purposes, that person has to be paid in between those projects for bench time. When GSS America and the named

defendants, who are Defendant Patel, Defendant Capalby,
Defendant GSS India, all -- Defendant Marepally, Defendant
Yerrasmsetti, these are all people specifically identified
to have knowledge of a falsified LCA document that was
submitted to the United States Government saying we are going
to pay this guy \$60,000.00 a year, and they knew they
weren't.

Your Honor, we could also comment on the relationship between GSS India -- or what we call GSS India -- GSS Infotech and what defendants call GSS. We did not specifically allege facts from which the Court could decide to pierce the corporate veil because we believe there is an independent basis for liability for each of the individuals as well as the two defendants GSS India and GSS.

Miss Pinto did allege facts which form a basis to pierce the corporate veil. And Judge Lindberg in a motion to dismiss, which I have a copy of the decision -- I imagine his clerk could provide for you as well -- determined those facts as pled, if true, would provide a basis for piercing the corporate veil.

There is clearly a close relationship between the two organizations and a sharing of many functions. And I understand and apologize for the fact that we are well beyond the pleadings. But I feel as though we -- we shouldn't place form over substance with respect to what we know to be true

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versus what may or may not have been exactly listed in the complaint. Given the opportunity, we can plead facts that would support piercing the corporate veil based on what we now know from Miss Pinto and information that she has We chose not to do that because we believe that each entity is independently responsible, that we have alleged facts which are like that.

Finally, with respect to Mr. Chalasani, I -- Miss Domph must have forgotten or I must have forgotten to provide a copy of the statement, sworn statement, from her client provided by -- to me by the former counsel for CES that clearly demonstrates that Mr. Chalasani never informed CES of anything that he was doing for GSS. That was the basis for the dismissal of that defendant. It certainly doesn't provide a basis for the dismissal of Mr. Chalasani based on his own statement, which, again, we have and can provide.

Again that is going outside the pleadings, which we are not entitled to do at this point, I understand, but I don't want your Honor to get the impression from defense counsel's arguments that just because facts do not happen to appear in the complaint, that that doesn't mean that they are not true or that we now know that they are true.

Finally, Mr. Pinelli mentioned that the only thing that can provide a basis for liability under the forced trafficking laws was withholding documentation of the -- that

authorized an individual to be here in the country. We now know through the sworn statement from a former defendant that was taking place with respect to some individuals. It was not taking place with respect to the plaintiff, but it was taking place with respect to other workers here on H-1B visas.

THE COURT: What was taking place?

MR. WOOD: That they were withholding authorizations that -- they were basically withholding the visa form work that showed that the individuals were in the country, that they were -- that the visa has been approved, that they had been granted visa status, that the company was withholding that documentation and not sending it out to the individual.

From our perspective as what happened with respect to Mr. Mallanngari, the same thing effectively was occurring here. He was not being provided pay stubs. He needed those pay stubs to try to transfer his employment, which he -- once he realized there wasn't a position, that he knew he needed to go elsewhere to find income. So not having the pay stubs made it far, far, far more difficult for him to be able to transfer a visa and find another sponsor. So from my perspective, there is little difference between actually keeping the visa paperwork that says you are authorized to be here or keeping the pay stubs that an employee like Mr.

Mallanngari can use to transfer.

Some of the arguments that defendants raise as to deficiencies in the pleadings we can't dispute. What we do know is that we -- or what we do believe is that based on the standards that the Court must apply at this stage, we have alleged sufficient facts to move forward on the claims on which we are continuing to try to move forward on. We voluntarily dismissed claims when we thought there was no basis the wage claims -- the fact that -- the fact that -- the fact that the defendants characterized the state wage law claims as redundant ignores a broad variety of federal issues.

And, you know, I believe in the Illinois
Legislature's right to make another law that would also hold
defendants accountable as well as the FLSA law with respect
to certain individual defendants -- that the individual
defendants on which we are pursuing those claims, we believe
we have alleged facts and explained facts on which those
individual defendants should be held individually
responsible.

THE COURT: Let me just take a brief break to consult with all the brains here. And then if I have additional questions, I will let you know when I come back. Okay?

Thanks for being here.

1 (Brief pause.)

THE COURT: Okay. Please be seated.

Okay. Here is what we think we should do: "We" meaning you: I think that I should -- I should grant you leave to file another amended complaint. In that complaint I think you should restrict yourself to what relief your client wants for himself and what facts he has of his own knowledge to support that relief.

Now, I know that the whole area of fraud and the Federal Rules gets to be a bit of a Catch 22 because sometimes you don't know what you don't know, but it seems to me that rather than name lots of people who might have undefined ways of being involved as co-defendants -- and I am not a Rule 11 sanction guy, so very rarely do I -- I grant Rule 11 sanctions, but I do believe if somebody has been named as party in a lawsuit, has to hire lawyers to get out of that lawsuit, then unless the person making the allegations against them personally has a factual basis for making those allegations, at the very least they should get their attorney's fees paid to get out of it.

So my suggestion is that you file a second amended complaint in which you allege what your client want -- wants, what -- only what he personally knows rather than general allegations about Judge Lindberg's lawsuit or things that you have heard the Department of Labor is doing, et cetera, et

cetera.

And, obviously, during the course of discovery on that -- because we would be at issue on that -- additional facts may come out that would give you a substantial basis for having a RICO claim or adding other individual defendants who might have been really controlling GSS indirectly or directly. Then that would be appropriate then. But given pleading standards of the Federal Rules, I don't think that your client has alleged enough firsthand knowledge here to move forward without me dismissing a number of those claims.

I also -- on the duplicative claim of the state action, I think you are perfectly entitled to allege a State action as well and the time -- you know, actually I have had a bunch of lawsuits like that. No one is going to double collect. There is likely to be two modestly different theories of collection. And it really makes jury instructions exciting, if it ever went that far, to try to avoid double collection. But I have been in that position before. I have stumbled and made a lot of mistakes, but I haven't made that mistake on a wage claim sort of matter again. So I think that that is a valid thing to do.

So it is up to you. If you want me to decide this motion to dismiss as it sits there, I am likely to do it, but I am also likely to not have seen information in this complaint which I think adds a number of these defendants on

good faith basis. Obviously, we are here because if GSS was in the process of systematically doing this to lots of people -- and I noticed they are not flooding the courtroom -- one suspects that some of them got American jobs and they are very happy and so maybe they weren't injured. Maybe they were actually helped in some nice, human way, if extra-legal way. But if you -- that I wanted to clarify that.

But if -- if you want to purr -- to rest on what you have, I will decide the motion to dismiss. But if I don't find adequate factual basis for every defendant named, I am likely to award that defendant compensation for having to show up and having to defend itself in the absence of specific knowledge on your client's part. If you want to start with something narrower and in the course of discovery were saying, I know they weren't just a consultant, they were running GSS and telling everyone to do that, and they had a basis for doing it, then that would be a basis for bringing someone in as manager of some kind of conspiracy.

What would you like to do? Do you want to take a final fresh run at this and if facts are unveiled during discovery, you can amend, or do you want to give it a shot where you are now, knowing that I think this is pretty mushy under the federal standards?

MR. WOOD: I guess I am a little confused as to our options, and then would also appreciate some period of time

to consult with the client about it because it is his lawsuit, not mine.

THE COURT: Your options are to have me decide the motions that are pending now, which look like pretty good motions to me. But it is -- you know, you have got all these pages and all these parties and the chart -- even you required a chart, so -- well, that is fine. Life isn't simple, and I am happy to work my way through it. But based on the review of it I have made and my law clerk has made and the discussions we have had and what you have said today, it doesn't look to me like you have a RICO conspiracy alleged based on knowledge that your client has. You are -- if I am wrong, be happy -- that the -- you are assuming that because there is smoke in a number of other directions, that something is there. And maybe it is. But I didn't write the Federal Rules.

And with respect to the individual defendants, if their relationship is not in any kind of controlling way and they are not independent, both, I don't see how they get involved in this lawsuit either as parties -- they might be witnesses and maybe some day you will get enough information to make them a party -- but I don't think they should be dragged into what is essentially a 40 to \$50,000.00 wage claim.

Also, I was under the impression that your -- your

client had been lured from a village in India here, and now I know he was here on a student visa. He wanted to stay. And because other people might have had papers taken away, I heard nothing today that would have stopped him from saying, this isn't what I thought it was, I am going home. And he, apparently, decided not to do that. So I find that a little troubling too.

So that is what I -- so you can stand on what you have and I will rule. You might expose yourself to some costs if cases get dismissed. Or you can par it down to what he knows and what you really think you are entitled to. And if during the course of the disputes that defense counsel guarantee us will transpire, other people with other facts want to step forward or facts emerge which make other parties implicate other parties, then you could amend your complaint to do that. I think those are your two basic choices.

MR. WOOD: Just to make sure I understand, when you say "facts he knows," do you mean he and his attorneys as agents or do you mean what is personally --

THE COURT: He knows. Whoever is signing that complaint has got to know it.

MR. WOOD: Right.

THE COURT: So it is not we think there is somebody else out there that filed a complaint with the Department of Labor and we think they are worried about the same thing, we

think a former employee who said something and is settled knows this. You shouldn't sign unless you know it to be true, unless you have some factual basis for it.

MR. WOOD: Right.

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THE COURT: There is also option No. 3 which lawyers forget, which is settle it. Make a reasonable demand. And the defendant shouldn't worry about your demand. You should make -- if you -- there is a certain price for which you would like to get rid of this lawsuit, offer it to the plaintiff and see whether or not they take it. You know, I -- I think too often defendants are put off by plaintiff's But if a plaintiff has nothing, putting a little bit of money on the table clarifies that. And certainly if he were to prevail on any of his theories, his lawyers are going to have a daunting amount of work. So you guys, hopefully, are going to get paid by the lawyer hour. But plaintiff's counsel, I am guessing, isn't sending out monthly statements. But there is going to be a huge amount of work, win, lose or draw.

So your main goal to represent your client is get what money you think he should have had for that nine-month period. If I -- if he were sitting here, I would say, look, why don't you offer X number of dollars and see if -- why don't you demand it and see if they will pay it and get this all over with.

1 But -- so do you want to let us know? When would 2 you like to report back? 3 MR. WOOD: We could report back as to which route 4 we would like to pursue in a week or two. 5 THE COURT: Right. I would vote for -- today is 6 the 15th. I would vote for -- how about February 25th? 7 MR. WOOD: Okav. 8 THE COURT: That is at 9:00 o'clock. I will set it 9 on the 9:00 o'clock call. But since we are all e-mail 10 friends, if you don't want to have -- and not all defendants 11 need to be here. If we don't hear in advance, if one of you 12 could come, I won't be offended if the others don't come. 13 But you are always welcome. But if you want to e-mail what 14 you would like to do to us, then we can avoid everyone having 15 to come over here. And I could respond by e-mail and we 16 could move on with the lawsuit. 17 And -- but if you want me to decide it, that is 18 I mean if you feel good about the complaint and your 19 defense against the motion to dismiss, that is fine. 20 do my job. And I don't mean that sarcastically. It is a lot 21 of work. And I will go into it with an open mind and open 22 heart. 23 MR. WOOD: If the plaintiff would choose to amend 24 the complaint, approximately what time would we be given to 25 amend?

THE COURT: Well, you tell me. 1 2 MR. WOOD: Okay. 3 THE COURT: You tell me what time you want. Say I 4 would like until X to file an amended complaint. 5 MR. WOOD: Okay. 6 THE COURT: You know, so I am not -- and I -- you 7 know, we wouldn't be here if I weren't troubled by this 8 apparent way of doing business. You know, if -- if what you 9 have alleged is true, it is somewhat troubling. So here we 10 are. 11 Thanks. 12 Thank you for your time, your Honor. MR. WOOD: 13 MR. FIEWEGER: Thank you, Judge. 14 THE COURT: Thank you all for being here. 15 (Which were all the proceedings heard.) 16 CERTIFICATE 17 I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript 18 from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 19 20 s/Rosemary Scarpelli/ Date: July 16, 2010 21 22 23 24 25